Back Home* – Electricity Prices After the Mild Winter of 2015/2016

After a year away on my sabbatical in Botswana where I spent my time researching off-grid solar systems and learning about energy challenges in Southern Africa, I have returned home and am back to teaching and doing research at Franklin Pierce University. My time in Botswana was interesting, complicated, frustrating, and ultimately very rewarding. I had the opportunity to meet some very interesting people, I visited solar installations in some very unique and remote places, and was involved in the installation of a 20 kW photovoltaic system in a village just outside of Gaborone, the capital of the country. During my time in Botswana, I developed a far more nuanced understanding of the challenges associated with energy supply and demand in the developing world and learned to appreciate the reliable and inexpensive electricity and water supplies we have here in the US.  

Even though I plan to continue my interest in Southern African energy matters, I am now focusing again on NH energy issues. I thought it would be fitting to start where I left off a year ago and take a look at electricity prices and what the future might hold, especially after the mild weather experienced in New England last winter.

When looking at electricity prices, I always start by looking at wholesale prices. We have a very dynamic market for electricity in New England because we have a formal and well-run market organized by the independent system operator in New England, ISO-NE. (See my blog Extraordinary Machine to learn more.) We have 350 generators of electricity bidding to sell their electricity into the market. This includes nuclear power plants, coal, natural gas- and biomass-fired operations, as well as wind, solar, and hydro. This all makes for an interesting and dynamic market.

The figure below shows historical wholesale prices for electricity going back to 2010. It is interesting to note that, after three winters of spiking electricity prices, prices were very calm this past winter. This resulted from several factors.

Source: EIA

 First and most important, it was a mild winter – some have called it the winter that wasn’t (while I was away in Africa, my snow blower only received one workout). A good indication of how mild the winter was comes from examining the heating degree days (HDDs) (see A Hundred and Ten in the Shade for an explanation of heating degree days). The chart below shows HDDs for the past 12 years. We normally experience about 7000 HDD over a year (July to June) in NH and 6000 for the whole of NE; this past year, the values were ~15% lower, with values of 6000 and 5300, respectively. That was indeed a whole lot warmer, but I was taken by surprise that the HDD values for 2012/13 indicated an even warmer winter that year. Like many other folks, I tend have a short memory about past winters, except when they are extreme, but the data show that the winter of 2012/13 was the warmest in the past 12 years – at least as measured by HDDs values. An examination of the wholesale prices for that winter in the figure above shows some daily prices spikes, but nothing to the degree we experienced in the following three winters.

Source: ISO-NE

The other key driver for low electricity prices is low natural gas prices. Over the past winter, ~55% of the electricity produced in New England was from natural gas: as a result, natural gas prices had a big impact on what we paid for electricity. The two big uses of natural gas in NE are for home heating and electricity production. With the mild winter, there was enough natural gas to go around for both heating and generation. Daily prices did not spike, which was quite different from previous years. The figure below shows the extraordinarily tight correlation between natural gas prices and electricity prices in NE – when natural gas prices spike so do electricity prices.

Source: ISO-NE

Wholesale prices for electricity are presently of the order of 2 c/kWh. This is great, but what are the implications for us as retail electricity customers? Well, less positive than we would like. In NH this past winter, retail electricity prices were in the region of 18c/kWh, almost 9 times the wholesale rate, as shown in the figure below.

Source: EIA

It is important to appreciate that wholesale electricity prices are a small component of what we, as rate payers, shell out for electricity. Baked into the retail rates are a host of charges: there are charges to pay for the transmission and distribution networks; there are long-term contracts that the utilities have entered to purchase electricity (most likely at higher than 2 c/kWh); there are overheads, salaries for the utility company employees, etc.; and, in the case of Eversource, there is the cost of operating their generating facilities – which produce electricity for a whole lot more than 2 c/kWh. On top of this is the profit that the regulated utilities are allowed to earn on their investment in infrastructure. It is a long list of costs and additional charges that gets us all the way from 2 to 18 c/kWh and well worth a closer look in a future blog. It turns out that the utilities from which we buy our electricity end up buying a relatively small portion of their electricity from the wholesale market – a lot of their supply is from long-term contracts that they signed up for years ago. Of course, when wholesale prices are low we don’t like this but, when prices spike up to 45 c/kWh, as they did in the winter of 2013/14, we are quite grateful that our electricity suppliers have locked into lower cost long-term contracts.

Despite last year’s mild winter weather, if this upcoming winter were to be a very cold one, we should expect to see spikes in both natural gas prices and wholesale electricity rates that will impact what we pay for electricity. ISO-NE has taken some important steps in New England to mitigate these spikes through their winter reliability program and by increasing storage of liquefied natural gas, but we have not taken any steps to significantly increase natural gas supply. If we have a very cold winter again, we will see price spikes and then we will go through another round of handwringing and planning for increasing natural gas supply. The truth of the matter is that we do not have a long-term view about our energy supply here in New England. Plans to increase natural gas supply have been scuttled due to opposition or our desire to have the pipeline companies take all the risk. These are both good reasons for not increasing supply, but we must bear in mind that most existing energy infrastructure in the US has been built with some government intervention via regulated monopolies. Ultimately, every one of those infrastructure investments impacted somebody somewhere. If we do not want to invest in energy efficiency, we as energy consumers will end up paying in one of two ways: we will pay for infrastructure investments through costs and direct impacts on our property, our environment, and way of life, or we will suffer the consequences of not investing in infrastructure and creating unreliable supply conditions. Ultimately, it is our choice.

I like to take a look at what the futures markets are predicting for NE electricity prices and, even though futures markets are about looking forward, I also like to look back at their prices from the previous year and see how things have changed, especially with the warm winter we had. The figure below is a comparison of the future prices from last year with those at present. It is clear that there has been some change in the market’s view of upcoming electricity prices. As usual, we are seeing a market forecast of winter price spikes, but, compared with last year, the spikes are smaller and the base-line prices are also lower. This chart also gives one a sense of the challenges the utility companies face as they look to lock in sufficient electricity to supply us over the coming years. Do they secure long-term higher-priced electricity contracts, do they subject us to the whims of the short-term markets and maybe prices won’t spike again like last winter, or do they mitigate potential price spikes by buying insurance through futures contracts. These are important and challenging decisions that the utilities make under regulatory supervision because ultimately it is NH ratepayers that end up paying for whatever choice they make. What would you do?

Source: CME

As we consider the consequences of choices, I am going to wrap up this data-heavy post with an updated chart for default electricity rates for the four NH regulated electricity utilities. (Remember that default rates only reflect the retail costs of electricity and do not include the distribution costs.) These rates, shown below, are a direct reflection of the choices the utilities have made, under regulatory mandates, regarding the sourcing of electricity. Presently, PSNH default rates are substantially higher than those of Liberty, Unitil, and the NH Electric Cooperative. The rates for PSNH presently reflect the high costs associated with operating their own generation facilities, including the coal-fired Merrimack power plant. Even though there have been times that the rates for the other utilities have been higher than those for PSNH (due to wholesale market price spikes), their default rates have generally been lower. Now that the divestiture of the PSNH generating assets has finally started, it will be interesting to follow how PSNH’s rates in the future will compare with those of the other NH utilities.

Source: NH PUC

That wraps it up for this post. It is good to be back teaching in NH and learning about statewide energy matters. Feel free to email me to suggest topics for future blogs and, in the meantime, remember to turn off the lights when you leave the room.

Mike Mooiman

Franklin Pierce University

mooimanm@franklinpierce.edu

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*Back Home A great upbeat singalong tune by Andy Grammar. 

Should I Stay or Should I Go?* - PSNH and Electricity Deregulation in New Hampshire

Over the past few blogs, I have taken a look at electrical utilities in NH and at the State's largest electrical utility, PSNH, in particular. I have also highlighted the regulatory compact that exists between a state and its public utilities. That compact can change through policy changes, so in this post, we take a look at the start-and-stop process of electricity deregulation in New Hampshire and how it has impacted PSNH. 

Until 1996, PSNH's business model was pretty simple, as shown in the figure below. It was a regional monopoly, solely responsible for generating, transmitting and distributing electricity to consumers within its franchise area. It totaled all the costs associated with its services (generation + transmission + distribution), built in its regulated return on assets, divided it by the number of kilowatt hours of electricity sold and came up with a price for supplied electricity. This price then had to be reviewed and approved by the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (NHPUC). PSNH was the classical, vertically integrated, regulated utility company.  

 

In 1996, however, in response to high electricity rates and the electricity deregulation wave that was sweeping the country at that time, NH deregulated the electricity business and introduced competition into the generation (or electricity supply) part of the business. The logic behind deregulation was that competition would remove the monopolistic position of the electrical utilities, it would increase competition, and the outcome would be lower prices for electricity and more services for consumers.

At the same time, it was recognized that, while the electricity generation side of the business could be opened up to competition, the other two parts of the electricity business—transmission and distribution— should remain as monopolies. In the primer on public utilities, I pointed out that one of the reasons for allowing monopolies in the provision of public services, such as electricity, is that it avoids the congestion problem: if we allowed competition in the transmission and distribution of electricity, our state would be crisscrossed with transmission towers and power lines from different companies and our streets would be cluttered and festooned with wires and poles from different distribution enterprises - perhaps like the picture below.

 

An essential aspect of deregulation was that the public utilities should get out of the generating business altogether and sell off their generating assets as it was determined that true competition could only arise if the monopoly controlling the wires did not run their own product (electricity) through their wires. The concern was that the entity that owned the transmission and distribution network would naturally favor their own generated electricity and would put up overt, as well as subtle, barriers to competition. That was the initial deregulation plan for New Hampshire and so electricity restructuring in NH required the utilities to sell their generating plants.

But then in 2000, there was a major bump in the road to deregulation.

California was one of the first states to deregulate electricity supply in 1996. The California utilities had to sell off their generation assets and they were also prevented from setting up long-term power supply agreements with generators. Moreover, retail rates for many consumers were capped but wholesale rates were allowed to float. It soon became apparent that this system was very fragile and ripe for being gamed. Electricity suppliers rapidly figured out that closing down of in-state plants, for maintenance or other reasons, would increase wholesale power prices and increase their profits. This, combined with dry weather, which created a shortage of imported hydro power, led to electricity supply shortages in California, blackouts and sky-high wholesale prices in 2000 and 2001. With a cap on retail sales in some areas, utilities soon found themselves selling retail electricity at lower costs than they were purchasing at wholesale. Clearly this could only last so long: it ended up crippling some of the larger California electricity utilities and driving one of the largest, Pacific Gas and Electric, into bankruptcy.

The State of California declared a State of Emergency and had to scramble to set up long-term power purchase agreements to ensure electricity supply — at an enormous cost to California rate payers. Much of the blame was subsequently leveled at Enron, who were accused of market manipulation. Careful reading of the California electricity crisis, however, indicates that market manipulation was only one of many causes of the problem. Poorly constructed deregulation policy seems to have been the more important aspect. Regardless of the reasons, electricity deregulation in California was viewed as little short of a disaster.

NH legislators had the benefit of observing California's travails from afar and quickly took their foot off the deregulation pedal and in 2001 the State delayed the divestiture of PSNH's non-nuclear generating assets. This left NH with the hybrid system, or partial deregulation, that we have today, with competition in the supply of electricity but with PSNH also supplying electricity from its own generating assets. The structure of the electricity business in the PSNH franchise area now looks like the figure below.

 

We now have 18 competitive electric power supply companies and 92(!) aggregators who have the opportunity to offer competitive prices to their customers. Their prices are based on market rates and whatever supply agreements these companies can establish. We also have PSNH supplying electricity to its customers, but this price is regulated and is calculated on the basis of the costs required to run their generation facilities and guaranteed return on their generation plants divided by the amount of electricity supplied. As a regulated supplier of electricity with high fixed costs due to their generating facilities, the cost basis for PSNH's electricity is therefore higher.  As a result many PSNH customers have migrated to lower cost competitive suppliers, leaving PSNH with less customers over which to spread these costs — which then drives their costs for electricity even higher.

In the table below, I have provided a sampling of the residential electricity supply rates in New Hampshire which include those from other NH electrical utilities as well as competitive suppliers in the PSNH franchise area.

 

 

As can be noted from data in this table, PSNH's standard rate for electricity supply (referred to as their default rate) is higher for their customers than that of competitive suppliers as well as other NH electrical utilities. This has now become cause for concern for legislators and regulators alike. Earlier this year, NHPUC commissioned a report to review the situation and their recommendation is that the State needs to complete the process of deregulation and compel PSNH to divest their generation assets. PSNH strongly disagrees with this position, as shown by Gary Long, the previous long-term CEO of PSNH, in his recent testimony and in a PSNH report. Completing deregulation and getting PSNH to divest their assets is a perennial issue in NH politics, but the argument has become far more intense during the past two years due to the flood of customers leaving PSNH for cheaper electricity supply rates and the increasing burden the remaining customers face via increased energy service rates.

There are good reasons for and against divestiture on both sides. I have attempted to summarize below the main points for and against compelling PSNH to sell of its generating assets.

Arguments for Holding onto Generating Assets 

1. Deregulation in California was a disaster for the state and for some utilities that went bankrupt as energy supply companies were able to game the system. This would not have occurred if utilities had been allowed to hold onto their generating assets.
2. Many states have pulled back from deregulation or have not completed their deregulation plans. Only 15 states offer retail choice.
3. Owning generating assets like hydro and coal-fired power stations allows the diversification of energy supply, which better serves NH customers as energy commodities go through different cycles of high and low prices.
4. Reliability of electricity supply could suffer because the only motivation for independent power producers is profit. If it is not in their best interest to supply power at market rates, they can simply turn off their generating plants.
5. PSNH provides a safety net for its customers. If you cannot or do not sign up with any of the other providers, PSNH is obligated to serve you. The generating assets are part of that safety net.
6. High energy service rates in NH are more a result of policy created by law makers than PSNH's doing.
7. The region has become heavily dependent on natural gas, for which there is no storage. Any interruption of natural gas supply, such as a pipeline problem, will have an immediate impact on electricity supply. Coal plants have at least some stocks of coal on site.
8. Divestiture can result in a increased costs to all PSNH customers increase because PSNH would need to be compensated for lost returns on the sale of the assets via stranded cost recovery.
9. Winter energy prices for New England would be higher if PSNH did not continue to operate their plants especially during the high demand winter months.

Arguments for Divestiture:

1. The original intent of deregulation was to have all electrical utilities sell their generating assets. PSNH is the only utility not to have done so and, to complete the deregulation process, they must be compelled to divest the generating plants.
2. If PSNH owns their own generation operations, they will be likely to favor their own generating plants and make it expensive and challenging for competitive suppliers of electricity.
3. There has been considerable migration of customers away from PSNH, which has led to PSNH distributing the costs associated with its generation operations over a smaller and smaller group of remaining customers, which will continue to increase the costs for electricity supply to these customers. Higher prices will, in turn, prompt further migration away from PSNH, and eventually leave PSNH with no customers. This has been characterized as the PSNH "death spiral".
4. PSNH energy customers are paying higher than market rates due to the generating assets. This is taking money out of NH consumer pockets and passing it onto PSNH,  their parent company, Northeast Utilities and their shareholders.
5. PSNH coal-generating plants are polluting, expensive to run and sit idle for a great deal of the time, but they still earn a continuous and assured return for their shareholders which is extracted from their energy customers.
6. NH ratepayers are the only New England rate payers that are on the hook for paying the costs of utility-owned electricity generation plants.
7. Reliability and resource adequacy of electricity supply is not the responsibility of one utility. We have a regional electrical grid shared by the New England states and as such is the responsibility of the regional grid authority, the Independent System Operator – New England, also know as ISO-NE, to maintain reliability and supply adequacy.

It is important to note that I am not making judgments on the merit or correctness any of these "Should I Stay, or Should I Go?"* arguments. Indeed, each one of them is worth its own blog posting, hours of legal debate and a thick consultant report. They are simply some of the for and against reasons that have been advanced in this debate. There are, no doubt, some that I have missed, so if you see a big omission in the listing of arguments, please share it with me.  

This knotty situation is further complicated by the fact that the generating assets are listed on the PSNH books at $674 million and, in the present coal-unfriendly and low-priced natural gas environment, it is unlikely that buyers are going to be lined up, like on new iPhone release day, to purchase PSNH's coal-fired assets. Regardless, this is a complicated issue, and it is one that the regulators and legislators in NH are presently wrestling with: one way or another, it is going to impact the wallets of PSNH rate payers.

In a future post, I will look at possible outcomes of this debate. Until next time, remember to turn off the lights when you leave the room—even if you do have cheaper electricity from a competitive supplier.

Mike Mooiman
Franklin Pierce University
mooimanm@franklinpierce.edu
10/24/13 
 

(*Should I Stay or Should I Go - A fine 1982 tune from The Clash, my second favorite British punk group off their appropriately titled "Combat Rock" album. Rated at 228 on Rolling Stone's "The 500 Greatest Songs of All Time" list. That's about right, I'd say.)

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