Walking on the Wild Side* - Stranded Costs and Picking up the Tab for the PSNH Power Plants

In my recent blog post, Options, I discussed the four options that will be considered as regulators and legislators deliberate over the fate of the PSNH power plants. One of these options is to compel PSNH to sell their generating assets and to complete the process of electricity deregulation in NH that was started in 1996. This would make the electricity supply market in NH a fully competitive one. In this post, I examine how this might be done, what the consequences will be for the PSNH customers, and how they will end up picking up the tab for the PSNH power plants. 

As laid out in the discussion of the public utility regulatory compact in an earlier post, a State provides an electrical utility with a monopoly to provide service in a specific area so that it can make the large-scale investments it needs to provide us with safe, reliable and reasonably priced power. Once they do so, they are entitled to recover the cost of the investment and earn a guaranteed return on those investments over the life of the projects - which can some range from 20 to 30 years, and even longer in the case of nuclear power plants.

Consider the following highly simplified example by way of illustration. If an electrical utility agrees to invest $1 billion in a new power plant and receives approval from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), they would go out and borrow the $1 billion, perhaps at a cost of 5%. Then, once the plant is built, the utility would, over time, recover the $1 billion through a depreciation charge and they would assess a return on their investment. This return would, of course, be higher than the 5% which is their cost of borrowing. Let's assume the plant has a 25-year life, so the depreciation amount would be $40 million per year ($1 billion divided by 25), which would be passed on to the ratepayers as part of the price for electricity supply. Moreover, the utility would also be entitled to earn a return on its investment. Assuming the public utility regulators agree to a 11% return (which is close to what PSNH presently earns), that first year the utility would earn $110 million (11% of $1 billion) which they would recover as a rate base charge that is a component of the all-in costs for electricity paid by their customers.

In Year 2, the depreciation from the first year is subtracted, leaving $960 million ($1000 million - $40 million) of undepreciated value which then becomes the basis for the 11% return on the rate base in the second year. In this year the return would be $960 million x 11% or $106 million. With this approach, the utility recovers its initial outlay via a depreciation charge over the life of the power plant, and it earns a return on its investment via the rate base charge.

It is important to realize that the utility's return on the rate base is not all gravy and it doesn't all go to its shareholders. The utility borrowed that $1 billion and it needs to pay its lenders their annual interest rate, which we assumed to be 5%, so the utility's net return on the invested capital will be 6%.

On top of these depreciation and rate base returns, the utility charges their customer for the cost of fuel – natural gas, coal or oil – as well as the operating and maintenance costs, the salaries for the workers, the property taxes and all other small charges associated with running an operation generating electricity. All these charges are summed and then divided by the number of kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity produced. This yields a price per kWh for electricity which, after review and approval by the PUC, becomes the rate that the utility charges its customer for electricity supply.

In my last post, I shared a chart which showed the various costs components, including depreciation charges and rate base returns, for the 2012 electricity supply from PSNH. Electricity rate setting is an intriguing topic and it is perhaps something we could cover in a future post.

But, let's now return to the topic at hand: what will happen should PSNH be compelled to sell off their generating assets? The key numbers in this case are shown in the figure below, which breaks out the various values that will be considered in this matter. The top number, $674 million, is the total book or undepreciated value of PSNH assets as of 2012. The original value before the depreciation charges was $1.1 billion according to the Northeast Utilities 2012 balance sheet. My assessment of the book value is that it consists of $422 million associated with the mercury scrubber installed on the Merrimack power plant a few years ago and the remainder, $252 million, is the undepreciated value for the rest of the generating assets A list of these generating assets, which include coal-fired, oil-fired and hydro operations, was provided in my last post.

From the book value of $674 million, I have subtracted the value that PSNH might realize from the sale of their various power plants. I have optimistically assumed a value of $200 million - which leaves us with approximately $474 million of what are termed "stranded costs".

These costs are termed "stranded" as they represent the value of the assets on which PSNH can no longer earn a return nor can they recover their investment via depreciation charges due to utility regulation changes. Nevertheless, PSNH is still responsible for interest payments and paying down the debt they incurred when they purchased and installed the assets many years ago.

I had also noted previously that there is presently a prudency review underway that will determine if PSNH should have spent $422 million on the mercury scrubber at the Merrimack plant when the original budget was $250 million. If it is determined that PSNH was unwise in spending that amount of money, the New Hampshire PUC will make a determination that only part of those costs should be part of the book value for PSNH generating assets and the stranded costs will decrease commensurately.

It is unlikely that PSNH would agree with such a decision. We should not forget that PSNH, through its parent, Northeast Utilities, is a for-profit publically traded company that has an obligation to its shareholders to ensure steady dividend returns and an increasing share value and it is only to be expected that they will mount a legal challenge to the NHPUC scrubber value determinations as any write-off of assets would have a significant effect on their profits and lead to a bunch of unhappy shareholders. In the legal battle will that will ensue, the NH Courts may end up determining the final value of the Merrimack scrubber project. In the process, millions will be spent on lawyers, consultants and expert witnesses, time will drag on, rates for PSNH energy supply customers will continue to be high and the value of the coal-fired power plants will continue to diminish. From my perspective, this seems rather inefficient compared to getting everybody involved around a table for a few days to hammer out a compromise: things might get done faster, a great deal of money would be saved and the PSNH ratepayers would be better served.

Let's assume, for the sake of illustration, that a determination is made that the scrubber project is only worth the original $250 million. PSNH would have to take a haircut of $172 million and write down the value of the assets. In this case, the numbers would be those shown in the diagram below.

Now the total book or accounting value would be $502 million, which would consist of $250 million for the value of the scrubber and $252 million of undepreciated value for the rest of the generating assets. From this, we subtract the $200 million that PSNH might realize from the sale of the assets which leaves us with approximately $302 million. This will be the amount due to PSNH for their stranded costs. The question now becomes: Who writes that check? As it turns out, the unpleasant answer is that all PSNH customers will end up paying for the stranded costs, as will become clear in the explanation that follows.

PSNH has approximately 500,000 customers and, for the purposes of simplification and illustration, let's assume they are all equal. That means each rate payer would have to send PSNH a check for $604 to cover their portion of the stranded costs. PSNH will want that money as soon as possible so that they can invest the $302 million into another project to start earning a return or return the money to its shareholders. It is unlikely that PSNH customers are going to be rushing for their check books to write a $604 check payable to PSNH. One alternative would be for PSNH customers to pay down this amount over time through their electricity charges and also pay PSNH their expected 11% interest. Essentially PSNH would be lending the $604 to each of their rate payers, and they would expect to earn a return on that loan. If we assume the payments are spread over 10 years, this means that each rate payer would be paying an extra $8.32 per month to PSNH for the next 10 years to cover the stranded costs. In kilowatt hour terms, and taking into account that PSNH distributed 7821 Gigawatt hours of electricity in 2012, this would equate to surcharge of ~0.6 cents for every kWh of electricity distributed by PSNH.

In these days of low, single-figure interest rates, 11% is a very high interest rate to pay on a loan. Many of you might be asking whether is it not possible to refinance this amount at a lower interest rate, just as we would do on our home mortgages?

Well, this is exactly what would happen should the regulators and legislators steer PSNH ratepayers down this road. There are many financial institutions that would be willing to lend PSNH customers the $302 million at a lower interest rate, especially if they can be assured, by law, that PSNH ratepayers are obligated to pay down the debt over a fixed time period and that there is no way to avoid the obligation.
 

This refinancing of the stranded costs is done through a process called securitization, which is a series of financial deals in which debt obligations, such as mortgages, are sold to another party and are pooled with similar obligations. This pool of obligations is then sliced and diced and sold to a new set of investors who pay for the pieces in order to earn a return on their investment that would, in this example, come from principle and interest payments that each homeowner with a mortgage makes every month.

The key aspects of securitization are

• The transference of risk from the original party that held the obligation to a new group of investors.
• The original party gets their money back right away so they can invest it in new projects.

The way that securitization would work with stranded costs is via the following steps:

Step 1: The regulators, with legislative approval, would establish a financing order which will give PSNH the right to impose, bill and collect stranded costs from its ratepayers. The stranded costs become an asset on the PSNH balance sheet which replaces the $674 million for the generating assets.

Step 2: A new financial company, called a special purpose enterprise (SPE), is set up.

Step 3: PSNH sells its right to collect stranded costs from PSNH ratepayers to the SPE.

Step 4: The SPE funds the purchase of stranded cost obligations from PSNH by selling bonds to investors such as banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions. For those not financially inclined, a bond is essentially an IOU agreement that is set up between two parties. One party lends an agreed amount of money and the other commits to pay back the borrowed amount at some time in the future but also to pay a fixed interest rate every year. In this case, the security for the IOU would be the stranded costs obligations that PSNH can, by law, collect from its ratepayers.

Step 5: Using the revenue from selling these bonds, the SPE will pay PSNH for the stranded costs so PSNH gets a cash payment, it no longer has the asset on its books and it can take the money and return it to its investors.

Step 6: Every month the stranded costs payments from the individual rate payers will be passed through PSNH to the SPE, which will use these payments to pay the interest on the bonds and eventually the principal amount back to the bond holders.

This securitization process accomplishes two objectives: PSNH gets its money right away and it can return the funds it to its shareholders or use it for new projects, and the risk associated with the stranded costs is passed onto a new group – the bondholders in the SPE.

The risk issue is an important one and, quite frankly, this is not a very risky investment for the bond holders. PSNH customers will be mandated by law to pay for the stranded costs so the risk of 500,000 ratepayers not paying up is low. (There is, however, the possibility that future lawmakers in NH would not feel constrained by these obligations and could choose to overturn them, but this is little different from the risks that lenders to public utilities are presently exposed to.)

With a steady stream of monthly payments from a large group of customers that are mandated by law to pay for the stranded costs through their electricity rates, this is indeed a low risk investment and, as a result, the bond investors would be willing to accept a much lower interest rate than the 11% PSNH would expect. In our present low-interest environment, I believe investors in these bonds would be willing to accept interests rates of 5% or perhaps even lower. Costs for funding would also be significantly reduced by the fact that interest on debt is tax deductible, exactly like your mortgage, which further reduces the cost of borrowing.

What we would then have done through securitization is refinanced that $302 million obligation to PSNH, which carried an interest rate of 11%, to one with a 5% interest rate. In the process, the monthly payments for PSNH ratepayers will drop from $8.37/month to $6.41, or from 0.6 to 0.5 cents per kWh, which is a 23% reduction in the monthly stranded cost obligation for all PSNH ratepayers. So by issuing lower interest rate bonds through the SPE, stranded cost recovery amounts charged to PSNH ratepayers will have decreased – hence the name: rate reduction bonds. In reality, these rate reduction bonds will actually result in additional tariffs on all PSNH ratepayers, but the amount is lower due to refinancing. It is important to note that the numbers I have calculated are presented for illustration of these concepts only and that the final numbers could be quite different depending on the outcome of the prudency review, the final stranded costs tally and the market for securitization of these costs in a year or two.

Now some readers might be thinking that this is pretty wild and crazy financial stuff and that we are clearly walking on the wild side*, financially speaking. Well, that would not be correct. Securitization is a long standing tool that is used extensively in the mortgage industry, and it is, in fact, one of the reasons we have such a robust home lending market in the US. It very likely that after receiving your mortgage for your home, your obligation was sold to another party who pooled your mortgage together with several thousand similar mortgages via a SPE. Bonds in the SPE were sold and bond holders were promised regular interest payments based on the monthly payments from that pool of mortgages. As my Financial Management students in the Energy and Sustainability MBA program at Franklin Pierce University learn, securitization and the unchecked transference of risk played a large role in the 2008/2009 housing crisis and recession. Moreover, securitization for stranded costs payments has been done before here in New Hampshire: PSNH ratepayers are presently assessed a stranded cost recovery charges associated with the Seabrook power plant as part of their monthly electricity rates.

One of the questions we should be asking ourselves with respect to stranded cost recovery is - which customers of PSNH will be obligated to pay these charges? The answer  – I believe – is that all PSNH distribution customers will be assessed these charges, including those getting their electricity provided by competitive suppliers. The key to stranded costs recovery is the establishment of the financing order by the NH PUC that will give PSNH the right to impose and collect stranded costs from its customers. However one of the most critical aspects of this financing order will be that these charges are non-bypassable. In other words, PSNH customers will not be able to avoid them by going to other electricity suppliers. Without this provision, the issuance of rate reduction bonds is unlikely to happen as bond investors would view it a particularly risky investment if ratepayers could escape their obligations.

Now, if you live in the PSNH franchise area and are buying your electricity from a competitive supplier, you are likely whipping yourself up into a froth of indignation at the unfairness that you should be assessed charges related to PSNH's generating operations. However, do take into account that many of these obligations were likely incurred when you were a PSNH electricity supply customer and present PSNH customers might consider it unfair that you could walk away from your obligations. A greater unfairness probably occurs when someone new moves from out of state into the PSNH franchise area and is assessed stranded costs recovery charges they had absolutely nothing to do with.

There is, of course, the possibility that things will play out differently in the legislative and legal deliberations that will occur over the next year or two, but this is where I am placing my bet. If you are angry with stranded cost recovery charges that might be assessed, the very best way for you to show your indignation and to challenge PSNH is remarkably simple - use less electricity. Show PSNH that you mean business by investing in energy savings projects. Put in more insulation, upgrade your windows and heating systems and install low-energy lighting and solar heating systems.

And, of course, remember to turn off the lights when you leave the room.

Mike Mooiman
Franklin Pierce University

mooimanm@franklinpierce.edu
11/17/13

(*Walk on the Wild Side – Probably the best known song by the late and very great Lou Reed who just passed away last month at the age of 71. I remember listening to this song as a young teenager and having very little idea at that time what I was singing about as I accompanied Lou Reed on vocals. Fortunately, neither did my mom. Even if I didn't understand the lyrics, the arrangement, the "Doo, doo, doo" chorus and the very prominent bass line appealed to me.)


Click on this link to receive email notifications for Energy in New Hampshire updates

Options* - PSNH Generating Assets – The Choices

With the advent of retail choice for electricity supply in New Hampshire, there has been a great deal of migration away from PSNH. Fixed costs associated with their generating operations are high and, with a smaller customer base to spread them over, their electricity supply prices have increased. This vicious spiral of higher prices causing more migration, followed by higher prices for the remaining PSNH customers is plainly unsustainable. As a result, there has been a great deal of discussion by regulators and legislators in New Hampshire about this problem.

The NH Public Utilities Commission released a staff report dealing with this matter in June. The Legislative Oversight Committee on Electric Utility Restructuring has been meeting since the summer and much of their discussion and debate revolves around whether the State should complete the process of electricity deregulation and compel PSNH to divest themselves of their generating assets. It is anticipated by some that this would reduce PSNH rates and allow them to be more competitive. In my last blog, "Should I Stay or Should I Go?", I laid out the arguments for and against divestiture. In this post, I examine the options that are available with respect to the PSNH power plants.

 

But before we look at the options, allow me to share with you the story of the Brayton Point coal-fired power plant which is located very close to Fall River in Southeast Massachusetts. This is a large coal-burning plant with a generating capacity of 1535 MW from four turbines. It is situated on the water's edge at the top of Mount Hope Bay and is visible when crossing over the Braga Bridge on I-195 into the Fall River area. It is now even more noticeable due to the recent erection of two enormous 500 ft tall cooling towers.

 

Photo Source: Dominion

The plant had for many years been owned by Pacific Gas and Electric, a California utility. In 2005, the Brayton Point power plant and the coal-burning plant on Salem harbor in Massachusetts were sold to Dominion Resources. In order to continue to operate the power plant, Dominion was required to install the two cooling towers shown in the photo above at a cost of $500 million. The cooling towers were necessary to comply with an EPA edict to reduce the amount of single-pass cooling water from the operations. Prior to the cooling towers, the plant was cooled by simply pumping water from Mount Hope Bay through the power plant to get rid of the waste heat and then returning the water right back into the bay. In the process, water treatment chemicals were added, any aquatic life was shredded in the pass through the cooling operations, and a large volume of warm water was discharged which impacted the marine ecosystem in the bay.

 

After investing over $1 billion dollars into the operations to ensure environmental compliance, in March this year, Dominion Resources sold the Brayton Point power plant to a private equity group, Energy Capital Partners, along with one gas-fired and one coal-fired plant in Illinois. After owning the plant for just six months, in October this year, Energy Capital Partners announced that they were shutting down the plant in 2017. Their original plan had been to convert the plant to a gas-fired operation but they said that low electricity prices, reduced capacity payments (created by a surplus of natural gas prices), large investments required to meet environmental regulations, and the costs to operate and maintain an older plant did not warrant keeping the operations running. I tend to be somewhat skeptical that they only figured this out after their purchase. These private equity organizations do a great deal of due diligence and financial analysis beforehand and they hire the best experts to advise them. I think it more likely that they took into account beforehand that they might need to shutter the plant and the Brayton Point operation just became the ugly bruised apple in the package that they discarded as soon as it was prudent.

 

So what lessons do we draw from Brayton Point? Consider the following:

• Old aging coal-fired power plants in New England have little, if any, value in a sale in the present low-priced natural gas period.
• This does not bode well for future sales of coal-fired power plants in New England: if the plants are sold it is likely going to be for pennies on the dollar, if they are even sold at all.
• Enormous investments are necessary to ensure environmental compliance of these operations and, even after these investments, there is no assurance that these costs can be recovered. Dominion Resource squandered an enormous amount of shareholder value in environmental compliance and on those huge cooling towers which, just one year after their construction, were of little value to the new owners.
• Converting coal-fired operations to natural gas-fired operation does not seem to be an obvious solution, even when you have two new cooling towers at your disposal.
• Sometimes retiring an old coal-fired power plant is the best solution.

With the background of that sobering story in our mind, let us now return to PSNH and consider the options available as NH legislators, regulators and PSNH scuffle over the fate of PSNH's generating assets.

 

The options* are:

1. Do nothing.
2. Spread costs associated with generating assets over larger number of customers.
3. Move the generating assets into a separate company and become a competitive electricity supplier.
4. Sell generating assets.  

Let's explore each of these.

 

Option 1: Do Nothing
 

Well, this is pretty much what has been happening since 2001 when the process of deregulation and the sale of PSNH generating assets were halted by the NH legislature. But, as we know, retail choice for electricity supply has resulted in the exodus of a large number of customers to competitive suppliers. In 2012, only 26% of the electricity supplied to PSNH customers was generated by PSNH itself. The rest came from competitive suppliers and from PSNH purchases of electricity from independent power producers and the open market. PSNH rates are higher because it is distributing fixed costs over a dwindling customer base. This has been referred to by many as the "PSNH death spiral" and is a well known financial concern in businesses with high fixed costs. The cost components for PSNH-supplied electricity in 2012 are shown in the pie chart below. Almost 50% of the costs - operations, maintenance, taxes, depreciation and return on assets - are fixed in nature, with the rest being more variable (but likely with some fixed cost components).

 Data Source: NHPUC: DE 13-108

When challenged about the death spiral concerns, the PSNH response has been that this problem has been caused by poor policy and the fact that generation expenses can only be recovered from PSNH electricity supply customers and not from all PSNH's distribution customers. At the time this policy was formulated, it probably seemed reasonable and prudent that PSNH electricity service customers should bear the cost of PSNH's generating operations. But, in hindsight, I think this migration and climbing cost issue might have been anticipated.

 

Option 2: Spread Costs Over a Larger Group of PSNH Customers
 

It is important to realize that PSNH has two types of customers within its franchise area. The first group is all electricity users within PSNH area which are all distribution customers of PSNH. Their electricity, regardless of who their contracted supplier might be, is transmitted, distributed and delivered by PSNH. As noted in my last post, PSNH has a monopoly on the transmission and distribution – the wire side - of the electricity business. In 2012, PSNH had just over 500,000 distribution customers (residential, industrial and commercial) within its area of operation and it delivered a total of 7821 gigawatt hours (GWh) of electricity.

 

The second and smaller set of customers are the energy supply customers. These are the customers that are using PSNH as their supplier of electricity as well. It should be noted that customers within the PSNH service area have retail choice – they can choose to have their electricity supplied by another company and, as noted in "Should I Stay or Should I Go?", there are now many such companies in NH willing to supply electricity. In 2012, PSNH had ~450,000 energy supply customers (residential, industrial and commercial) within its area of operation and it delivered approximately 4600 GWh of electricity.

 

When we compare distribution and energy supply customers, we note that PSNH only supplies 59% of the electricity within its service area. Since the advent of retail choice, or being able to choose your electricity supplier, this number continues to shrink. This, of course, is the cause of concern as PSNH has high fixed costs and is distributing those costs over a smaller and smaller customer base.

 

It has been suggested that it might be a better idea to distribute the fixed costs over a larger group of customers, i.e., all PSNH's distribution customers, because all the decisions regarding PSNH present operations and investment in generating facilities were made when those customers were captive energy supply customers of PSNH. As such, they could be viewed as having an obligation to share the costs of those generating facilities. Some have suggested that it is unfair that a customer that migrates to a competitive supplier can walk away from their commitments and leave a larger obligation on the shoulders of the remaining energy service customers.

 

I am not sure how much "fairness" plays into it, but this does seem to go counter to the spirit of retail choice and competition. Distributing the costs of the PSNH power plants over all PSNH distribution customers would, in essence,  involve placing a PSNH surcharge on the electricity service provided by a competitive supplier. Ultimately, this is what we might indirectly end up with, as I note in the discussion of stranded costs in Option 4 below, but in this case there is absolutely no incentive for PSNH to act competitively by improving operating efficiency, reducing costs, and working with smaller profit margins. The only reason for considering this option would be if the regulators and legislators felt that is critically important for New Hampshire's energy future that PSNH hold onto its own generating fleet and they wanted to counter the exodus of customers from PSNH.

 

Option 3: Move Generating Assets into a Separate PSNH Company and Become a Competitive Electricity Supplier
 

One of the arguments that has been made by the folks at PSNH is that the generating assets of PSNH are critical to NH's energy future and that the diversity of supply, offered by the coal-burning operations is a valuable attribute that should not be discarded. It this is indeed the case, another option is to move the electricity-generating assets into a separate PSNH- or Northeast Utilities-owned company and to make that new company a non-regulated competitive energy supply company that would have the opportunity to compete on the same terms as the other energy suppliers now operating in the State.

 

Under these circumstances, the new entity, perhaps called "PSNH Homegrown Power", would no longer be entitled to a guaranteed return on assets. It would have to make its money by the traditional business approach, which is by assuring that the costs for electricity generation are lower than the revenue obtained from selling electricity. Of course, the concern is that the fixed costs for the coal-fired gas plants are high—the cost of the main fuel, coal, is higher than that of natural gas (on an energy content basis) for most of the year and the only time PSNH can successfully sell electricity into the grid is when electricity prices are high due to demand. Moreover, there is also the looming issue of the discharge of cooling water from the Merrimack plant that I alluded to in Sixteen Tons. Due to the new wastewater permit for the operation, it is likely that the installation of large cooling towers, such as those at the Brayton Point plant and costing well over $100 million, will be required.

 

Running an operation such as this will be rather challenging: PSNH and its parent company, Northeast Utilities, would have to be willing to invest additional capital into the generating operations as well as deal with years of negative financial returns until such time that natural gas prices rise and coal becomes competitive again. This would indeed be a long-term view and one that might be difficult to sell to the shareholders of Northeast Utilities. It certainly did not work out for the folks who owned the Brayton Point plant.

 

Option 4: Sell Generating Assets
 

The final option for PSNH is simply to sell off their assets. This is being extensively debated  by legislators and regulators at this time, as I discussed in my last post. On one hand, this seems like the most straightforward option, as it completes the process of electricity deregulation in New Hampshire. On the other hand, it is also the most challenging to implement and it is the option that will have a financial impact on all PSNH customers.
 

The generating assets of PSNH include ~1200 MW of generating capability, as shown in the table below. 

These generating assets are listed on the PSNH financial statements at $1.1 billion but with a net depreciated value of $674 million. PSNH is allowed to earn a return of 11.05% on this $674 million of assets, which, in 2012 (along with some other charges), was approximately $83 million. PSNH also recovers their investment via a depreciation charge. The depreciation is typically 2.5% per year so the depreciation expense is ~ $17 million. Of course, the dollar value of the return decreases every year as depreciation whittles away slowly at the book value of the assets.

 

The bulk of this $674 million value for the generating assets is the $422 million recently spent on the scrubber that was installed at the Merrimack plant to reduce mercury emissions from the burning of coal. The original budget for the scrubber was a "not to exceed" figure of $250 million but, by the time it was completed, the price had skyrocketed to $422 million. A study is presently underway at NHPUC to determine whether it was prudent for PSNH to spend $422 million for a scrubber on an aging coal plant. The outcome of this prudency review, and the court battles that are likely to follow, will be very important to the rate payers in the PSNH franchise area as they will determine future rates for electricity supply and distribution.

 

If PSNH is compelled to sell off their generating assets, it is highly unlikely that the sale will raise $674 million. The gas- and wood-fired plants in Newington and Schiller might attract some attention but they are old plants. The most attractive assets of PSNH are the hydroelectric plants, which are likely to draw a great deal of interest from operations that specialize in running hydroelectric operations, such as Brookfield Energy Partners. In this coal-unfriendly and low-priced natural gas environment, the Merrimack and Schiller coal-fired plants will likely be the most problematic to sell, particularly in the wake of the Brayton Point plant experience. If the plants are sold, it is not going to be for very much if they are even sold at all. The coal-based plants could even be viewed as having a negative value. If they are not sold and are simply shut down, there will be significant costs associated with the cleanup of the sites as well as ongoing monitoring and maintenance. They simply cannot be abandoned and cleanup could be costly, especially considering PSNH has been operating on these sites for over 50 years.

 

A recent NHPUC report that considered the sale of PSNH generating assets, indicated that PSNH might realize between $100 million to $300 million for the sale of its generating assets. A detailed follow-up study, due early next year, has been commissioned.

 

The diagram below breaks out the various values that will be considered in this matter. We have the book value, $674 million, of PSNH assets, which are comprised of $422 million,  the value of the scrubber, and approximately $252 million of undepreciated value for the rest of the generating assets. From this, we subtract the value that PSNH might realize from the sale of the assets – I have optimistically assumed a value of $200 million - which leaves us with approximately $474 million of what are termed "stranded costs". By law, PSNH is eligible to recover these stranded costs from its ratepayers. Of course, if the outcome of the prudency review is that the book value of the scrubber is less than $422 million, PSNH will have to write down the value of these assets and then the stranded cost amount will be less.
 

 

  

These stranded costs are a very large sum of money that the PSNH customers are going to be responsible for and are one of the definite downsides that come from having a regulated public utility which can, by law, recover investments made uneconomic by policy changes. Stranded costs will likely be recovered by allocating a surcharge on all PSNH customers, even if their electricity is not supplied by PSNH. In this way it becomes very similar to Option 2. At least with the divestiture and stranded costs realization option, the obligations of the rate payers become fixed and, over time, the obligation to PSNH will be paid down.That is not the case with Option 2 which is an open-ended obligation with no fixed amount and no end in sight.

 

So there you have the options that the regulators and legislators in NH are grappling with. A final determination regarding PSNH's generating assets might be made next year but I would not hold my breath. Instead save it for the numerous legal battles that are sure to ensue as soon as final determination is made. In my next post, I will examine the concept of stranded costs in more detail, how they will be funded and how the cost of funding might be reduced through a financial tool called securitization.

 

Until next time – remember to turn off the lights when you leave the room. Leaving them on just gives energy suppliers an opportunity to distribute their fixed costs over even more kilowatt hours of electricity.

Mike Mooiman
Franklin Pierce University
mooimanm@franklinpierce.edu
11/5/13 

 

 

(Options* - A catchy tune by the highly underrated group, Gomez. The band originally started in the UK but most of the members seem have found their way to the US. The group is known for their well constructed, clever and very catchy tunes. Their album How We Operate is a great introduction to their work.)

Click on this link to receive email notifications for Energy in New Hampshire updates

Should I Stay or Should I Go?* - PSNH and Electricity Deregulation in New Hampshire

Over the past few blogs, I have taken a look at electrical utilities in NH and at the State's largest electrical utility, PSNH, in particular. I have also highlighted the regulatory compact that exists between a state and its public utilities. That compact can change through policy changes, so in this post, we take a look at the start-and-stop process of electricity deregulation in New Hampshire and how it has impacted PSNH. 

Until 1996, PSNH's business model was pretty simple, as shown in the figure below. It was a regional monopoly, solely responsible for generating, transmitting and distributing electricity to consumers within its franchise area. It totaled all the costs associated with its services (generation + transmission + distribution), built in its regulated return on assets, divided it by the number of kilowatt hours of electricity sold and came up with a price for supplied electricity. This price then had to be reviewed and approved by the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (NHPUC). PSNH was the classical, vertically integrated, regulated utility company.  

 

In 1996, however, in response to high electricity rates and the electricity deregulation wave that was sweeping the country at that time, NH deregulated the electricity business and introduced competition into the generation (or electricity supply) part of the business. The logic behind deregulation was that competition would remove the monopolistic position of the electrical utilities, it would increase competition, and the outcome would be lower prices for electricity and more services for consumers.

At the same time, it was recognized that, while the electricity generation side of the business could be opened up to competition, the other two parts of the electricity business—transmission and distribution— should remain as monopolies. In the primer on public utilities, I pointed out that one of the reasons for allowing monopolies in the provision of public services, such as electricity, is that it avoids the congestion problem: if we allowed competition in the transmission and distribution of electricity, our state would be crisscrossed with transmission towers and power lines from different companies and our streets would be cluttered and festooned with wires and poles from different distribution enterprises - perhaps like the picture below.

 

An essential aspect of deregulation was that the public utilities should get out of the generating business altogether and sell off their generating assets as it was determined that true competition could only arise if the monopoly controlling the wires did not run their own product (electricity) through their wires. The concern was that the entity that owned the transmission and distribution network would naturally favor their own generated electricity and would put up overt, as well as subtle, barriers to competition. That was the initial deregulation plan for New Hampshire and so electricity restructuring in NH required the utilities to sell their generating plants.

But then in 2000, there was a major bump in the road to deregulation.

California was one of the first states to deregulate electricity supply in 1996. The California utilities had to sell off their generation assets and they were also prevented from setting up long-term power supply agreements with generators. Moreover, retail rates for many consumers were capped but wholesale rates were allowed to float. It soon became apparent that this system was very fragile and ripe for being gamed. Electricity suppliers rapidly figured out that closing down of in-state plants, for maintenance or other reasons, would increase wholesale power prices and increase their profits. This, combined with dry weather, which created a shortage of imported hydro power, led to electricity supply shortages in California, blackouts and sky-high wholesale prices in 2000 and 2001. With a cap on retail sales in some areas, utilities soon found themselves selling retail electricity at lower costs than they were purchasing at wholesale. Clearly this could only last so long: it ended up crippling some of the larger California electricity utilities and driving one of the largest, Pacific Gas and Electric, into bankruptcy.

The State of California declared a State of Emergency and had to scramble to set up long-term power purchase agreements to ensure electricity supply — at an enormous cost to California rate payers. Much of the blame was subsequently leveled at Enron, who were accused of market manipulation. Careful reading of the California electricity crisis, however, indicates that market manipulation was only one of many causes of the problem. Poorly constructed deregulation policy seems to have been the more important aspect. Regardless of the reasons, electricity deregulation in California was viewed as little short of a disaster.

NH legislators had the benefit of observing California's travails from afar and quickly took their foot off the deregulation pedal and in 2001 the State delayed the divestiture of PSNH's non-nuclear generating assets. This left NH with the hybrid system, or partial deregulation, that we have today, with competition in the supply of electricity but with PSNH also supplying electricity from its own generating assets. The structure of the electricity business in the PSNH franchise area now looks like the figure below.

 

We now have 18 competitive electric power supply companies and 92(!) aggregators who have the opportunity to offer competitive prices to their customers. Their prices are based on market rates and whatever supply agreements these companies can establish. We also have PSNH supplying electricity to its customers, but this price is regulated and is calculated on the basis of the costs required to run their generation facilities and guaranteed return on their generation plants divided by the amount of electricity supplied. As a regulated supplier of electricity with high fixed costs due to their generating facilities, the cost basis for PSNH's electricity is therefore higher.  As a result many PSNH customers have migrated to lower cost competitive suppliers, leaving PSNH with less customers over which to spread these costs — which then drives their costs for electricity even higher.

In the table below, I have provided a sampling of the residential electricity supply rates in New Hampshire which include those from other NH electrical utilities as well as competitive suppliers in the PSNH franchise area.

 

 

As can be noted from data in this table, PSNH's standard rate for electricity supply (referred to as their default rate) is higher for their customers than that of competitive suppliers as well as other NH electrical utilities. This has now become cause for concern for legislators and regulators alike. Earlier this year, NHPUC commissioned a report to review the situation and their recommendation is that the State needs to complete the process of deregulation and compel PSNH to divest their generation assets. PSNH strongly disagrees with this position, as shown by Gary Long, the previous long-term CEO of PSNH, in his recent testimony and in a PSNH report. Completing deregulation and getting PSNH to divest their assets is a perennial issue in NH politics, but the argument has become far more intense during the past two years due to the flood of customers leaving PSNH for cheaper electricity supply rates and the increasing burden the remaining customers face via increased energy service rates.

There are good reasons for and against divestiture on both sides. I have attempted to summarize below the main points for and against compelling PSNH to sell of its generating assets.

Arguments for Holding onto Generating Assets 

1. Deregulation in California was a disaster for the state and for some utilities that went bankrupt as energy supply companies were able to game the system. This would not have occurred if utilities had been allowed to hold onto their generating assets.
2. Many states have pulled back from deregulation or have not completed their deregulation plans. Only 15 states offer retail choice.
3. Owning generating assets like hydro and coal-fired power stations allows the diversification of energy supply, which better serves NH customers as energy commodities go through different cycles of high and low prices.
4. Reliability of electricity supply could suffer because the only motivation for independent power producers is profit. If it is not in their best interest to supply power at market rates, they can simply turn off their generating plants.
5. PSNH provides a safety net for its customers. If you cannot or do not sign up with any of the other providers, PSNH is obligated to serve you. The generating assets are part of that safety net.
6. High energy service rates in NH are more a result of policy created by law makers than PSNH's doing.
7. The region has become heavily dependent on natural gas, for which there is no storage. Any interruption of natural gas supply, such as a pipeline problem, will have an immediate impact on electricity supply. Coal plants have at least some stocks of coal on site.
8. Divestiture can result in a increased costs to all PSNH customers increase because PSNH would need to be compensated for lost returns on the sale of the assets via stranded cost recovery.
9. Winter energy prices for New England would be higher if PSNH did not continue to operate their plants especially during the high demand winter months.

Arguments for Divestiture:

1. The original intent of deregulation was to have all electrical utilities sell their generating assets. PSNH is the only utility not to have done so and, to complete the deregulation process, they must be compelled to divest the generating plants.
2. If PSNH owns their own generation operations, they will be likely to favor their own generating plants and make it expensive and challenging for competitive suppliers of electricity.
3. There has been considerable migration of customers away from PSNH, which has led to PSNH distributing the costs associated with its generation operations over a smaller and smaller group of remaining customers, which will continue to increase the costs for electricity supply to these customers. Higher prices will, in turn, prompt further migration away from PSNH, and eventually leave PSNH with no customers. This has been characterized as the PSNH "death spiral".
4. PSNH energy customers are paying higher than market rates due to the generating assets. This is taking money out of NH consumer pockets and passing it onto PSNH,  their parent company, Northeast Utilities and their shareholders.
5. PSNH coal-generating plants are polluting, expensive to run and sit idle for a great deal of the time, but they still earn a continuous and assured return for their shareholders which is extracted from their energy customers.
6. NH ratepayers are the only New England rate payers that are on the hook for paying the costs of utility-owned electricity generation plants.
7. Reliability and resource adequacy of electricity supply is not the responsibility of one utility. We have a regional electrical grid shared by the New England states and as such is the responsibility of the regional grid authority, the Independent System Operator – New England, also know as ISO-NE, to maintain reliability and supply adequacy.

It is important to note that I am not making judgments on the merit or correctness any of these "Should I Stay, or Should I Go?"* arguments. Indeed, each one of them is worth its own blog posting, hours of legal debate and a thick consultant report. They are simply some of the for and against reasons that have been advanced in this debate. There are, no doubt, some that I have missed, so if you see a big omission in the listing of arguments, please share it with me.  

This knotty situation is further complicated by the fact that the generating assets are listed on the PSNH books at $674 million and, in the present coal-unfriendly and low-priced natural gas environment, it is unlikely that buyers are going to be lined up, like on new iPhone release day, to purchase PSNH's coal-fired assets. Regardless, this is a complicated issue, and it is one that the regulators and legislators in NH are presently wrestling with: one way or another, it is going to impact the wallets of PSNH rate payers.

In a future post, I will look at possible outcomes of this debate. Until next time, remember to turn off the lights when you leave the room—even if you do have cheaper electricity from a competitive supplier.

Mike Mooiman
Franklin Pierce University
mooimanm@franklinpierce.edu
10/24/13 
 

(*Should I Stay or Should I Go - A fine 1982 tune from The Clash, my second favorite British punk group off their appropriately titled "Combat Rock" album. Rated at 228 on Rolling Stone's "The 500 Greatest Songs of All Time" list. That's about right, I'd say.)

Click on this link to receive email notifications for Energy in New Hampshire updates

Wind in the Wires* - New Hampshire Electrical Utilities and a Closer Look at PSNH

In this post I build on our knowledge of public utilities and take a look at electrical utilities in New Hampshire. I will take a particularly close look at the largest electrical utility in New Hampshire, Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH), as it has had a rather checkered history and it also provides a useful case study of the challenges faced by electrical utilities in these days of deregulation, low natural gas prices and waning interest in coal-fired electricity generation. 

In my last blog, I discussed the regulatory compact that exists between utilities and the communities they serve. The essence of this compact is that we provide the utility with a monopoly to provide service so they can earn predictable profits and we gain by getting build out of the required service infrastructure, the ability to negotiate reasonable rates as well as safe and reliable service.

We have all benefitted from this monopolistic business model that permitted the rapid electrification of the USA with electrical supply even spreading into rural areas. We have gained enormously from the reliability of our electrical supply – it is there all the time when we need it. (If you have reservations regarding the reliability of the US grid, I encourage you to spend some time in any of the less-developed countries to gain an appreciation for the dependability of US grid.) It makes possible our modern lives, it cooks our food, lights our homes and powers our communications and - increasingly - our transportation. Moreover, as knowing and unknowing investors in utility companies, we have benefitted from the regular profits and dividends produced by utilities that have funded part of our retirement and pension plans.

As noted previously there are three aspects to the electrical utility business as shown in the figure below. There is the generation of power, typically at a large power plant located in a central location. Then there is the transmission of electricity over long distances from the generation point to towns and cities and, finally, there is the distribution of electricity through the community via the sub-stations, wires and transformers to individual homes and businesses. Not all electrical utilities focus on all aspects of the business. Some for example, such as my local electrical company, just focus on the distribution part of the business. Others, such as the merchant wood-fired power plants or the wind farms in NH, just focus on generation, whereas other utilities, such as PSNH ,are fully integrated organizations involved in all three aspects of the business.

 

 In NH we find several types of electrical utility companies:

• There are those that are owned by shareholders who are seeking a financial return on their investments. These are referred to as investor-owned utilities (IOUs) which are most commonly public-traded companies. In NH the big three are (1) PSNH, which is wholly owned by Northeast Utilities (NU), (2) Granite State Electrical Company, which is part of the Liberty Utilities group owned by the Canadian company, Algonquin Power and Utilities Corporation, and (3) the NH-based Unitil company. The key to these organizations is that you do not have to purchase electricity from these organizations to be an investor and the more shares you own, the greater say you have in the running of the company. Because these companies are investor owned, they are driven by the need to maintain profitability and regular dividend payouts.

• Electrical cooperatives are organizations that focus on supplying electrical services to their customers who are the members and owners of the cooperative. New Hampshire Electric Cooperative is a good example. Each member of the cooperative has an equal voice in the organization and profits are used for infrastructure investments, maintaining low electricity rates or are paid out as dividends to members. These types of utilities are very customer focused as they don't have to face the investor pressure that the IOUs are subject to. These organizations are largely in the distribution business as they purchase their power from a number of generators.
 
• There are also electrical utilities that are run by local government organizations, such as municipalities. These are called "munis" and they are only responsible for the distribution of electricity within their communities. In NH we have a few of these organizations: Ashland, Littleton and Wolfeboro, among others, have their own municipal electric companies that are responsible for the distribution of electricity within their town limits.

A map of the service areas for the various NH electrical utilities is presented in the figure below. The blue areas belong to PSNH, the yellow to NH Electric Cooperative, the light green to Granite State Electrical Co. and the pink to Unitil. The few cross-hatched areas are the municipal electrical companies. If you want to examine this map in more detail follow this link.

 

The history of electrical utilities is a fascinating one and it started in 1882 with Thomas Edison's first generating plant in New York City that initially supplied electricity within a single square mile to 59 customers in what is now Manhattan's Financial District. Within a few years, there were over 30 generating plants supplying electricity in that city. However, the key player in the rise of electrical utilities was Samuel Insull, who was sent off to run the Edison electrical company in Chicago in 1892.

When Insull started his career in the electricity business, electrical companies were then limited local enterprises that generated and distributed electricity to customers within the vicinity of the generating facility. But Insull was a superb businessman and very astute, and he soon realized that to cover the enormous cost associated with generating plants, he needed to sell a large volume of electricity. To do so, he needed to increase his customer base to more than the customers in close proximity to the generating plant. To sell more electricity, he set up tiered electrical rates with lower rates available in lower demand periods, he invested in alternating current transmission technology which allowed him to transmit electricity over long distances and he invested in large coal-fired generating plants. He also bought up his competitors and, with his transmission capability and tiered rates, was able to diversify his customer base, sell more electricity over a wider area and increase the utilization of his equipment.
 
Insull also saw the benefits of a natural monopoly as it eliminated competition and would provide the returns necessary to raise money for the big infrastructure investments. He actively advocated for government regulation of utilities in order to ensure their status as a natural monopoly. As a natural monopoly he could be assured of a large customer base, steady revenue and profits and, with these, he could provide steady returns to investors and he would also be able to borrow money for large infrastructure projects at low interest rates. Insull's model was soon adopted by electrical companies throughout the country.

State regulation of utilities started in 1907 when New York and Wisconsin enacted regulations that required state oversight of utility financial performance and the establishment of electricity rates based on the revenues and costs of a utility. By the start of the World War I in 1914, most states had established regulatory bodies for electrical utilities. In NH, regulation of electrical utilities started in 1911 with the establishment of the Public Service Commission which was given oversight and rule-making authority over railroad and public utilities. In 1951, the Commission became the Public Utilities Commission and, in 1985, regulation of transportation activities and railroad were moved to the Department of Transportation.

Samuel Insull's influence even stretched into New Hampshire. In 1925 the Chicago-based, Insull controlled Middle West Utilities holding company purchased the NH-based Manchester Traction, Light and Power Company which supplied power to the City of Manchester and other companies on the Merrimack River. Middle West Utilities established the New England Public Service Company (NEPSCO) in 1925 to consolidate all of its New England acquisitions under one holding company. One year later, Public Services of New Hampshire was established as a formal company to operate all of the New Hampshire electrical companies that Insull's group had purchased (Source: History of PSNH). In the early years, PSNH operated steam, gas, electrical railway and bus services but, by the 1950s, many of these non-electricity businesses were closed or sold to allow PSNH to focus on supplying electricity. In those early years, a lot of PSNH electricity was generated by hydroelectric plants located on various rivers in NH but, as demand grew, PSNH built the large fossil fuel plants located in Bow and Portsmouth.
 
In 1972, PSNH started planning for the construction of the Seabrook Nuclear Power plant. The intent was to build two 1.2 GW reactors. Opposition to nuclear power, cost overruns and construction delays led to the commissioning of only one unit - 18 years later in 1990, at a cost of about $7 billion. The second unit was never completed and the huge debt taken on by PSNH lead to its formal bankruptcy in 1988 and its consequent acquisition by Northeast Utilities in that same year. It was the largest US bankruptcy at that time.
 
Northeast Utilities, the parent company of PSNH, is a publicly traded holding company that owns four electric companies, two natural gas companies and electric transmission business serving NH, MA and CT. Six of these are key companies here in New England: Connecticut Light and Power, NU Transmission, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, Yankee Gas Service Company, the recently acquired NStar Electric and Gas Company and, of course, Public Services of New Hampshire. The bulk of Northeast Utilities' revenue comes from the distribution and transmission of electricity rather than from its generation. Electricity generation only contributes 6% of NU's revenue, largely from the generating plants in NH.
 
Northeast Utilities is a profitable company with over $7 billion in revenues, a profit margin of about 11% and it pays out about 57% of its earnings as dividends. Return on net property, much of which is regulated, is about 8%. Based on its present stock price of $41/share, it earns its investors a dividend yield of about 3.6% - certainly much better than you and I earn by keeping our money in a savings account at a local bank. A great deal of NU's stock is held by institutional investors, mutual funds, retirement funds, insurance companies, etc., which means that a good number of us with 401K or retirement plans end up indirectly with an interest in NU.
 
If we take a closer look at the PSNH part of the NU business we learn the following:

In 2012 PSNH delivered 7821 GWh hours of electricity in NH and earned $946 million dollars doing so. This equates to revenue of 12.1 cents per kWh. Remarkably, only about 26% of this electricity came from PSNH's own generating fleet. The rest came from long-term power purchase agreements with other independent generators, such as the Iberdrola wind farm in Lempster, NH, and purchases on the short-term and spot electrical market administered by ISO-New England.
 
PSNH owns 13 transmission substations, over 100,000 distribution transformers of different sizes and more than 13,000 miles of transmission and distribution lines. PSNH also owns generating assets and, except for some small solar operations in Western Massachusetts, these are the only generating plants in the Northeast Utilities stable of assets.
 
The generation assets of PSNH include ~1200 MW of generating capability, of which the Merrimack and Newington plants are the largest. The table below provides some more detail on PSNH's generating assets in New Hampshire.

 
These generating assets are listed at $1.1 billion on the NU balance sheet and, based on the overall depreciated value of all PSNH assets (which include generation, transmission and distribution), the depreciated or remaining value of these generating assets are of the order of $700 million. The bulk of this value seems to be the $421 million spent on the scrubber at the Merrimack plant a few years ago. It is this scrubber, and its associated costs, that feature heavily in the ongoing deregulation and PSNH debate here in NH and which we will take a look at in future posts.

Operating an investor-owned regulated utility like PSNH used to be an easier task. They had a monopoly to serve customers, and every time they made an investment, they could pass on the costs to the rate payers and earn a reliable and quite generous return for their investors. The challenge was that they had to think long term - sometimes thirty years out or more and they had to make large investments in infrastructure and, to make those investments, they had to raise money that then needed to be returned over the long term. Electrical utilities had long depreciation timelines as it was assumed that their monopoly position would continue. All that would be fine if the world did not change - but it has. There is now a wind in the wires* as economic thinking has changed, consumers demand choice and competition, fuel prices have shifted and regulations allowing competition have been introduced.
 
With these winds of change blowing through the wires, many integrated utilities with generation assets find themselves in competitive, instead of monopoly, generation markets, and with a great deal of non-depreciated capital on their books, as well as the obligation to service the long-term debt they incurred when they originally funded the investments. This, in turn, leads to the issue of stranded cost recovery, in which the utilities, having made their long-term investments, seek compensation for those investments when they cannot realize their anticipated returns due to regulatory changes. This is a very critical part of the present debate about PSNH and its generation assets and we will take a closer look at these issues in future posts.
  
In my next post, we will take a look at the very different world that the integrated electrical utility companies now face. In the meantime, be sure to turn off the lights when you leave the room - but keep in mind that every time you do, there is an electrical utility investor who will be unhappy that you did.

 
Mike Mooiman
Franklin Pierce University
mooimanm@franklinpierce.edu
10/6/13

(*Wind in the Wires – A dark tune about electricity from Patrick Wolf, a young UK artist who draws a lot of chamber music influences into his arrangements. If you are a Smiths or a The Cure fan, this will appeal to you. Don't forget to apply the black mascara beforehand.)

 
Click on this link to receive email notifications for Energy in New Hampshire updates